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Commentary on Constitutional Court Judgment 107/2025: Constitutional limits of Parliamentary Investigative activity after the Spanair Case. | Molins Criminal Defense

Commentary on Constitutional Court Judgment 107/2025: Constitutional limits of Parliamentary Investigative activity after the Spanair Case.

Can Parliament, in the exercise of its investigative function, name the political perpetrators of a tragedy without violating their presumption of innocence or damaging their honor? The case of Manuel Azuaga, former president of AENA, reopens a relevant debate on institutional limits, the role of investigative committees, and the risk of impeachment proceedings becoming a public trial without fair trial.

Judgment 107/2025, issued by the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court on May 12, 2025, represents a step forward in the consolidation of constitutional jurisprudence on the limits of parliamentary investigative activity and the protection of the fundamental rights of those appearing before the court. In the judgment now under analysis, the Constitutional Court resolves the appeal for constitutional protection filed by Mr. Manuel Azuaga Moreno, former president of AENA, against certain aspects of the opinion issued by the Commission of Inquiry of the Congress of Deputies, which was established to investigate the accident of Spanair flight JK5022 on August 20, 2008.

First, the appellant challenges the tenth conclusion and ninth recommendation of the opinion for violating his right to honor, to the presumption of innocence in its extrajudicial aspect, to the right not to testify against himself, and to effective judicial protection (Articles 18.1 and 24 of the Spanish Constitution). Second, the appellant also questions the conduct of his appearance before the Commission of Inquiry, as well as the debate on the opinion in the Plenary Session and the Chamber’s own investigative activity into the accident under investigation. Specifically, the tenth conclusion is challenged, which identifies the appellant and other senior officials as among those responsible for the systemic failure to establish, evaluate, evolve, verify, and correct the weaknesses of the air safety system. The existence of negligent conduct is also noted, and therefore the referral of such conclusions to the State Attorney General’s Office is requested in the ninth recommendation, which has also been the subject of protection, both statements being understood as an attack on the appellant’s personal and professional reputation. The appellant also criticizes the lack of guarantees in the conduct of the investigation and his appearance, as he was not warned that his statements could be used against him in any judicial or administrative sanctioning procedure.

For its part, the Spanish Parliament’s lawyer, representing the Congress of Deputies, requested the dismissal of the appeal for protection, arguing that the Commission did not exceed its powers of political control nor has it harmed the extra-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence protected by the right to honor, since the conclusions and recommendations of its final opinion do not establish legal responsibilities or sanctions of any kind but are limited to verifying an irregularity and political responsibilities devoid of legal consequences, in accordance with the doctrine of the Constitutional Court in STC 133/2018.

The Public Prosecutor’s Office also requested the dismissal of the appeal for protection of constitutional rights, recalling the “strictly political nature” of the Chambers’ investigative activity, which precludes the transfer to them of the guarantees of effective judicial protection or of the full range of guarantees that operate in the jurisdictional and administrative sanctioning spheres. The representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office also rules out any violation of the extra-procedural dimension of the principle of the presumption of innocence that could lead to a finding of a violation of the appellant’s right to honor, given that the ruling focuses on the political responsibility required of certain public officials in parliamentary proceedings, without determining any individualized legal liability. Regarding the conduct of the appearance and the challenged investigative activity itself, the prosecutor argues that they are preparatory or procedural acts that are not subject to challenge for protection of constitutional rights, the only definitive and binding act that can be challenged for protection of constitutional rights being the resolution of the Plenary Session approving the opinion of the Commission of Inquiry.

Well, in STC 107/2025, which is the subject of this commentary, the appeal for protection filed is dismissed because the contested tenth conclusion does not impute specific punishable conduct, but rather a generic political responsibility for the poor functioning of the system, while the ninth recommendation does not contain individualized charges or legal assessments, but rather an abstract referral to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in accordance with art. 76.1 CE.

Regarding the investigative activity and the conduct of the parliamentary appearance, the Court recalls its doctrine, set out in the recent STC 77/2023, in which it stated that, if “in the course of the investigation of facts likely to give rise to political liability conduct that has the characteristics of a crime or administrative infraction” is identified, the Chamber “must bring it to the attention of the judicial or administrative bodies entrusted with the exercise of the ius puniendi, and allow these bodies to be the ones that from that moment on are responsible for investigating the facts from the perspective indicated above.” However, in the judgment commented on here, the Court establishes that “[t]he parliamentary investigation may take these facts or conduct into consideration but from a perspective limited by what constitutes the object of its competence, that is, the strictly political liability that could arise from deficient or negligent management of the public interest entrusted to the persons or entities investigated.” In the present case, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal because the conditions under which the investigation took place or his appearance were not the subject of any complaint by the appellant to the Board of the Investigative Committee or the Speaker of the Chamber, whose actions are the ones that may be subject to constitutional review.

STC 107/2025 focuses on determining whether the contested parliamentary actions transgressed the limits that the constitutional order imposes on Parliament in its investigative function to conclude that in the present case, the existence of specifically slanderous, insulting or demeaning statements is not appreciated and therefore harmful to the right to honor of the appellant because the interference results from an activity of a parliamentary chamber which, as stated by the oft-cited STC 133/2018, FJ7, aims not only to control the Government, but also the action of the administration under its direction and because the contested texts affirm a generic and collective political responsibility of various people for the functioning of the security system as a whole without including specific or individualizable criticisms that allow any damage to be appreciated.

In short, STC 107/2025 confirms the full legitimacy of the exercise of political responsibility and reaffirms the political function of commissions of inquiry as an essential principle of Spanish constitutionalism. It also reinforces the framework of individual guarantees against potential excesses by Parliament in its oversight role, establishing that such activity cannot degenerate into a kind of “parallel trial” without guarantees. Thus, political activity cannot invade the jurisdictional sphere or violate fundamental rights.

The Court maintains a delicate balance between the right to parliamentary oversight and the individual rights of those appearing before it. However, the ruling leaves open the debate about the limits of parliamentary freedom of oversight when it directly affects specific individuals. In this regard, the question arises: to what extent a negative name-calling in a political opinion, even if without legal effect, can have an irreversible reputational impact? The Court limits itself to assessing whether there was a formal violation of fundamental rights, but does not address in depth the material consequences of this type of public accusation. This requires constant vigilance regarding the limits of individualized political accusations to prevent parliamentary judgment from replacing the judicial one in public perception.

 

Cristina Molins
Internal Investigations Department – Molins Defensa Penal